Generative adversarial networks (GANs) are a novel approach to generative modelling, a task whose goal it is to learn a distribution of real data points. They have often proved difficult to train: GANs are unlike many techniques in machine learning, in that they are best described as a two-player game between a discriminator and generator. This has yielded both unreliability in the training process, and a general lack of understanding as to how GANs converge, and if so, to what. The purpose of this dissertation is to provide an account of the theory of GANs suitable for the mathematician, highlighting both positive and negative results. This involves identifying the problems when training GANs, and how topological and game-theoretic perspectives of GANs have contributed to our understanding and improved our techniques in recent years.
Introduction
Generative adversarial networks (GANs) were proposed by Goodfellow et al. (2014) as a novel approach to generative modelling, a task whose goal it is to learn a distribution of real data points.
The term adversarial refers to the use of two opposing neural networks in GANs: a discriminator trained to tell real data samples apart from GAN-produced samples, Figure 1 .1: 1024 × 1024 images generated on the CelebA-HQ dataset. Image taken from Karras et al. (2017, Figure 5 ).
• Prob(X ) -the space of probability measures on X .
• C b (X ) -the space of bounded, continuous functions from X to R.
• [N ] -the set of integers {1, ..., N }, where N ∈ N.
• N (µ, σ 2 ) -the Gaussian distribution on R n with mean µ and variance σ 2 .
Chapter 2
GANs: Initial Results
Motivation
The goal of generative modelling is to learn a particular distribution p r of real data. The distribution p r may be represented explicitly 1 , or implicitly by providing a means to produce samples from the distribution.
The latter approach is taken by generative adversarial networks (GANs). We may view a GAN as a game between two players: a generator and a discriminator. The former is represented by a function G inducing a distribution p G (see below), and the latter by a function D.
Consider a GAN trained on images of people. Given a fixed generator, the discriminator is trained to distinguish between images produced by the real dataset (labelled 1) and images produced by the generator (labelled 0). It does so by mapping each data point x to a value in [0, 1] . In some sense, D(x) represents the probability that x was a real sample rather than a generated one.
The goal of the generator, consequently is to produce images that the discriminator will classify as being real, while the goal of the discriminator is to classify these same images as in fact being produced by the generator. The generator induces a distribution p G by taking a sample z from a (typically Gaussian) prior on input noise variables, p z , and mapping it to a synthetic data point G(z). Therefore, if z ∼ p z , then p G is the distribution such that G(z) ∼ p G .
The generator aims to produce points such that D(G(z)) is closer to 1. In other words, the generator is trying to fool the discriminator. As we shall see, it will succeed at doing so when the images it produces arise from the same probability distribution as that of the real images of people.
Minimax-GANs
To formally specify a GAN, we need to give to the generator and the discriminator an objective that each seeks to optimise. Though we may give the discriminator and generator distinct objectives, it is common and often useful for there to be one objective that the generator seeks to minimise, and that the discriminator seeks to maximise. In this case, which I shall refer to as the minimax 2 case, we can represent the objective by a single value function V (D, G).
Definition 2.2.1 (Idealised MM-GANs (Goodfellow et al., 2014) ). Let Z ⊆ R , X ⊆ R d be ambient data spaces, let p z be a prior distribution over Z, and let p r be the distribution of real data points over X . The idealised minimax GAN (IMM-GAN) is the game specified by the objective Remark 2.2.2. We observe that V IMM is the sum of two expected-value terms.
The first of these captures the idea that the discriminator wants to mark with high probability points from the real data set. The second of these terms captures that the discriminator also wants to mark with low probability points from the synthetic data set. It also captures the contrasting goal of the generator, which is to fool the discriminator into marking synthetic points with high probability.
Remark 2.2.3. This set-up is idealised, in that it searches for the optimal D and G over the space of all functions with the correct domain and co-domain.
Using this specification of the GAN game, we wish to show that the objective function is met precisely when p r = p G . If this is the case, then a GAN is successfully trained if and only if the generator distribution matches the target distribution: this is precisely what we require of GANs. To show this, we first give a result specifying the optimal discriminator, given a fixed generator.
Theorem 2.2.4 (Goodfellow et al. (2014) , Proposition 1). Fix G in the IMM-GAN game. The optimal discriminator D as required by the maximisation term in (2.2.1) is given by
Proof. Maximising V IMM with respect to D is equivalent to maximising
For any (a, b) ∈ R 2 \ {(0, 0)}, the function y → a log y + b log(1 − y) achieves its maximum in [0, 1] at a a+b . Since the discriminator does not need to be defined outside of the values of x for which p r and p G are non-zero, this concludes the proof.
Corollary 2.2.5 (Goodfellow et al. (2014) ). The IMM-GAN game is equivalent to finding min
2.4)
where G : Z → X , and
. (2.2.5)
Divergences for GANs
To show that the IMM-GAN objective function makes sense, we need to introduce one last important element: the notion of a divergence between two probability distributions. This is akin to a measure of distance between two distributions: if we minimise the divergence, we also hope that the two distributions are in fact equal. Divergences come up again in the next chapter, but for now it suffices to consider two possible definitions of divergence.
Definition 2.3.1. Let µ and ν be two probability measures, and suppose µ is absolutely continuous with respect to ν. The Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence from ν to µ is defined as
The Jensen-Shannon (JS) divergence is defined as
where M = (µ + ν)/2.
Two important properties of these divergences make them useful as a notion of the difference between two distributions.
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Proposition 2.3.2 (Kullback and Leibler (1951) , Lemma 3.1). Let µ, ν be two distributions for which the KL divergence is defined. Then d KL (µ ν) is non-negative, and equal to 0 if and only if µ and ν are equal almost everywhere. If µ and ν are discrete probability distributions, this is equivalent to µ being equal to ν.
Proof. This proof relies on log being concave, and − log thus being convex. Consider the case in which µ and ν are continuous probability distributions (the proof works for discrete distributions mutatis mutandis). Then, by Jensen's inequality:
Hence, d KL (µ ν) ≥ 0. If µ = ν almost everywhere, then it is clear from the definition that d KL (µ ν) = 0. Moreover, since log is a strictly convex function, then the weak inequality is an equality only if µ = ν almost everywhere.
Corollary 2.3.3. Let µ, ν be two distributions for which the JS divergence is defined. Then d JS (µ ν) is non-negative, and equal to 0 if and only if µ and ν are equal almost everywhere. If µ and ν are discrete probability distributions, this is equivalent to µ being equal to ν.
Proof. This follows from the above proposition, and noting that the JS divergence is defined as the sum of two (non-negative) KL divergences.
Appropriateness of Objective Function
The following theorem shows that the choice of objective function for the IMM-GAN is well-motivated.
Theorem 2.4.1 (Goodfellow et al. (2014) , Theorem 1). The global minimum of the training criterion C(G) is achieved if and only if p r = p G . At that point, C(G) achieves the value − log 4.
, so that C(G) = log 1 2 + log 1 2 = − log 4. To see that this is the minimal value of C(G), reached only for p r = p G , observe that
By subtracting this expression from C(G) = V (D * , G), we obtain:
Since the JS divergence between two distributions is always non-negative and zero only when the distributions are equal, we have that C * = − log 4 is the global minimum of C(G) whose only solution is p r = p G .
Using this proof, we may also establish that in the ideal case in which we may make updates within the function space, a broad class of convex optimisation algorithms may find this unique solution.
Theorem 2.4.2 (Adapted from Goodfellow et al. (2014) , Proposition 2). The function
is convex in p G .
Proof. We observe that only the second term depends on p G . The proof then follows from the linearity of expectation.
Practical Implementation of GANs
In practice we do not search over all possible functions G and D for our optima. Instead, we consider a family of parametrised functions G(z; θ G ) and D(x; θ D ) and optimise parameters θ G ∈ Θ G and θ D ∈ Θ D . The typical class of parametrised functions we consider are neural networks, often abbreviated to neural nets. A precise formalisation of neural nets is beyond the scope of this dissertation: the interested reader is referred to Goodfellow et al. (2016, Chapter 6) . It suffices to know that neural nets have the power to approximate a broad class of functions, and are differentiable with respect to their defining parameters. The latter fact means that an objective function defined in terms of a neural net may be maximised (resp. minimised) by taking steps in the parameter space proportional to the negative (resp. the positive) of the gradient, in a process referred to as gradient descent.
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Restricting our generator and discriminator to be neural nets allows for the GAN to be implemented and trained in practice.
Algorithm 1 Minibatch stochastic gradient descent training of MM-GANs (Goodfellow et al., 2014) . The gradient-based updates can use any standard gradient-based learning rule.
1: for number of training iterations do 2:
for k steps do
3:
Sample minibatch of m noise samples z (1) , ..., z (m) from noise prior p z (z).
4:
Sample minibatch of m examples x (1) , ..., x (m) from real data distribution p r .
5:
Update the discriminator by ascending its stochastic gradient:
.
6:
end for
7:
8:
Update the generator by descending its stochastic gradient:
9: end for
We formalise the new objective as follows:
Definition 2.5.1 (MM-GAN). Let Z ⊆ R , X ⊆ R d be ambient data spaces, let p z (z) be a prior distribution over Z, and let p r be the distribution of real data points over X . Let Θ D and Θ G be the spaces of possible parameters for the discriminator and generator, respectively.
5 The minimax GAN (MM-GAN) is the game specified by the objective min
where ] belong to classes of neural nets
Convergence Problems
Unlike its idealised counterpart, the MM-GAN objective function lacks counterparts to Theorems 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 that guarantee convergence to a unique solution such that p r = p G . This section reviews two particular problems with convergence observed when implementing this GANs in practice, and considers the theoretical explanations of their origins that have been offered. The remainder of this dissertation will focus on theoretically-motivated modifications of GANs that seek to ameliorate these problems.
Failure to Improve
There are two ways in which our generator may fail to improve, where the improvement is taken with respect to the quality of samples it produces. In the first case, though a solution may exist, the dynamics of the gradient descent training algorithm prevents the neural nets from reaching their optimal parameter values. Example 4.4.1 demonstrates this. In the second case, which is a special case of the first failure, the gradient along which the generator must train is diminished to the point that the generator cannot usefully learn from it. This is known as the vanishing gradient problem, or the saturation problem. Goodfellow et al. (2014) claims that this problem is caused by the discriminator successfully rejecting generator samples with high confidence, so that the generator's gradient vanishes. This suggests that we ought to avoid over-training the discriminator, and instead carefully interplay discriminator and generator improvements.
Mode Collapse
Mode collapse is a problem that occurs when the generator learns to produce only a limited range of samples from the real data distribution. It does so by mapping several different input values z ∼ p z to the same output point G(z).
The name 'mode collapse' comes from the fact that, when trying to learn a multimodal distribution, the generator only outputs samples from a select number of these modes. Metz et al. (2016) demonstrates this by showing how a GAN may fail to learn a toy data distribution consisting of a mixture of 2D Gaussian distributions (as seen in Figure 2 .2). Goodfellow et al. (2014) and Metz et al. (2016) postulate that mode collapse arises from the following fact, which I shall state and prove rigorously: Proposition 2.6.1. Fix a continuous D in the IMM-GAN game, and let X be compact.
6 The optimal generator G as required by the outer loop of (2.2.1) is given Figure 2 .2: An illustration of mode collapse on a toy dataset consisting of a mixture of Gaussians in two-dimensional space. In the bottom row, we see how as the GAN is trained over time, the generator only produces a single mode at a time, cycling between different modes as the discriminator learns to reject each one. Image taken from Metz et al. (2016) .
where s z ∈ arg max x∈X D(x). In other words, the optimal generator for a fixed discriminator maps every value z ∈ Z to some x ∈ X that the discriminator believes is most likely to be real rather than fake.
Proof. Since the discriminator is continuous with a compact domain, the set arg max x∈X D(x) is non-empty. We observe that only the second term in the value function
depends on G. Since log is a monotone function, we wish to choose G so as to minimise (1 − D(G(z))), or equivalently, so as to maximise D(G(z)). From this the statement follows.
. Let p r be any real data distribution with support on X compact. Then there exists a discriminator D such that
Proof. By the above result,
Taking D to be constantly 1/2, we get thatC(D) = − log 4 = min G C(G). However, this value forC(D) can be attained for any G whose value is constantly arg max y∈X D(y). In particular, it can be attained for a G such that p r = p G .
Suppose we viewed the objective of MM-GAN as finding
given by a finite-dimensional vector of values in [0, 1] , and so the space of all such grayscale images will be compact. Hence, compactness is assumed here and elsewhere without loss of practical generality.
By the above proposition, this approach seemingly encourages a scenario in which the generator favours producing only one output. The problem with the GAN training algorithm, according to Goodfellow (2016) , is that it does not demonstrate any preference over the maximin and minimax perspective. As emphasised by , this suggests we should seek to train the discriminator to optimality before each step of generator training. However, this runs counter to the advice given to resolve the problem of convergence failure. As such, we need to modify our GAN design so that we may train the discriminator to optimality, avoiding the issue of mode collapse, while at the same time avoiding convergence failures.
Chapter 3
The Topology of GANs
In the previous chapter, we saw that the original GAN (Goodfellow et al., 2014) formulation suffered from problems of convergence failure and mode collapse during the training procedure. In this chapter, I review a generalisation of the GAN objective function due to and . This generalisation gives us a deeper theoretical insight into the conditions that must be satisfied for a GAN to be able to successfully reproduce samples from a distribution.
Recall that, fixing an optimal discriminator and allowing updates to the function space, finding an optimal generator is equivalent to minimising the Jensen-Shannon (JS) divergence between the generator distribution p G and the real data distribution, p r . The generalisation in this chapter, taking this as inspiration, shows how changing our choice of objective function makes finding the optima of that function equivalent to minimising some divergence between the two distributions.
Of course, convergence depends on our choice of distance or divergence ρ(p θ , p r ) between these distributions. This chapter develops the argument in that GAN training demands a distance notion d W that induces a weaker topology than d JS , in that the set of convergent sequences under d W will be a superset of that under d JS . I shall then show the positive theoretical results of the corresponding GAN procedure, Wasserstein GAN (WGAN).
Adversarial Divergences
In Chapter 2, we established that, given an optimal discriminator, we can view the IMM-GAN game as a minimisation problem for the generator. In particular, Corollary 2.2.5 showed that the IMM-GAN game was equivalent to finding
. generalises this approach, viewing a GAN as seeking to minimise the objective function
for some class F of functions. 1 This leads to the concept of adversarial divergence.
Definition 3.1.1 (Modified from , Definition 1). Let X be an arbitrary topological space,
Example 3.1.2 (IMM-GAN (Goodfellow et al., 2014) ). If we set
where V = [0, 1] X , we recover our IMM-GAN objective with optimal discriminator, C(G).
Example 3.1.3 (Integral Probability Metric (Müller, 1997) ). We derive a particularly important class of GANs when we assume that, in the definition of adversarial divergence, we can write our bivariate function f as the difference of two univariate functions.
In particular, given a choice 2 of F, an integral probability metric (IPM) between two distributions is defined
is non-negative, satisfies the triangle inequality, and is symmetric.
Proof. The proof follows easily from the properties of the supremum.
Wasserstein GAN
This section defines the Wasserstein GAN (WGAN), which can be shown to arise from a particular choice of IPM. WGAN was originally developed by , after being theoretically motivated in . The theory has been developed further by and Lei et al. (2017) .
Earth-Mover Distance and Total Variation Distance
We first define two notions of distance between probability distributions, both of which can be shown to be examples of IPMs.
Definition 3.2.1. Let µ, ν be probability measures on a compact metric space (X , d). The Earth-Mover (EM) or Wasserstein-1 distance is given by
where Π(µ, ν) denotes the set of all joint distributions γ(x, y) such that, for all A ∈ B(X ),
Intuitively, γ(x, y) indicates how much 'mass' must be transported from x to y in order to transform the distribution µ into the distribution ν.
The following equivalent formula is more tractable when finding minima with respect to the Wasserstein distance.
Theorem 3.2.2 (The Kantorovich-Rubinstein Duality). Let (X , d) be a compact metric space, and let Lip 1 (X ) be the set of functions f : X → R such that
Then f ∈ Lip 1 (X ) is Lebesgue integrable with respect to any probability measure on X , and
Proof. The result is a standard one in optimal transport theory. See, e.g., Villani (2008, Theorem 5 .10) for a proof. An alternate proof can be found in Edwards (2011, Theorem 4.1). The presentation here is an adaptation of the latter approach, as given by Basso (2015, Theorem 1.3).
Since f is 1-Lipschitz, we have for some x 0 ∈ X that
Since X is compact, for any probability measure P on X we can integrate both sides of (3.2.3) with respect to P to obtain
Observe that since µ, ν are probability measures on a compact metric space, they are (bounded non-negative) Radon measures. Further, d : X 2 → R is continuous, and hence lower semicontinuous, as a distance metric. By Corollary 3.2 of Edwards (2011), we have that
Fix ε > 0. By the Approximation Lemma, there exists f, g ∈ B ∞ (X ) with
). Since g is bounded, k is well-defined. Then, for x, x ∈ X , we have that
Hence k ∈ Lip 1 (X ). Note further that, for all x ∈ X ,
Letting ε → 0, we get the desired equality.
Corollary 3.2.3. The EM distance is an IPM, so long as the domain X of our function class F is a compact metric space.
The following corollary tells us that it makes sense to describe the EM distance as a distance, and to talk of it inducing a topology. Proof. That d W is symmetric and non-negative is clear from (3.2.1), and that it obeys the triangle inequality is clear from (3.2.2). Hence it remains to show that for probability measures µ, ν on a compact metric space (
Observe that (f k ) k≥1 is a non-negative sequence of functions converging monotonically to the indicator function on X \ F , an open set. Hence, by the Monotone Convergence Theorem and (3.2.4), it follows that µ(X \ F ) = ν(X \ F ). Since open subsets of X generate B(X ), it follows by Dynkin's Lemma that µ = ν.
We obtain similar results for the Total Variation distance between two distributions.
Definition 3.2.5. The Total Variation (TV) distance between µ and ν is defined
(3.2.5) Proposition 3.2.6. The TV distance is an IPM, where F is the set of of all measurable functions bounded between -1 and 1.
Proof. See Müller (1997) .
Corollary 3.2.7. The TV distance defines a metric on Prob(X ).
Proof. By Corollary 3.1.4, it suffices to prove that d TV (µ ν) = 0 implies µ = ν. But this is given from the definition of d TV as a supremum: in particular, µ and ν are equal on all Borel measurable subsets, and so must be equal.
The Weakness of the Wasserstein Distance
We now seek to show that, in some rigorous sense, minimising Wasserstein distance is a more suitable framework for GAN training than minimising the Jensen-Shannon divergence. The adversarial divergence framework enables us to view the objective of GANs as the minimisation of some divergence between our generator distribution p G and our target distribution p r . Moreover, the framework can be used to consider the training of a GAN as the convergence of p G to p r with respect to the given divergence.
With distinct definitions of convergence come distinct induced topologies.
3 The idea of convergence gives rise to an idea of a topology induced by the divergence. Notably, we ought to seek some divergence that give us a weak topology, in that the convergence of p G to p r with respect to other divergences implies convergence with respect to our ideal divergence. Using the language of functional analysis, it can be shown that the Wasserstein distance meets this desideratum.
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Let X be a compact set. Taking the sup-norm f ∞ = max x∈X |f (x)|, the space (C b (X ), · ∞ ) is a normed vector space. We can then define the dual normed space (C b (X ) * , · ), where we take
Consider the mapping
By linearity of expectation, this function indeed maps to the appropriate dual space and so is well-defined. Therefore, by the Riesz-Markov-Kakutani representation theorem (Kakutani, 1941, Theorem 10) , Φ is an isometric immersion. This allows us to regard convergence in TV distance and convergence with respect to · as essentially equivalent. This is unfortunate for the TV distance: convergence with respect to the latter norm in C b (X ) * is regarded as 'strong' convergence, 5 in effect limiting the capacity of a TV-based GAN to train towards a variety of real distributions.
By contrast, C b (X ) * also comes equipped with a much weaker topology.
Definition 3.2.8 (e.g., , Definitions 7-8). Let X be a compact metric space. The weak * topology for Prob(X ) is the coarsest topology on Prob(X ) such that
is a set of continuous linear functions on Prob(X ). Moreover, we say that a sequence (µ n ) ⊆ Prob(X ) weakly converges to a measure µ ∈ Prob(X ) if, for all f ∈ C b (X ),
If we can show that the Wasserstein distance captures the notion of weak * convergence, then we may claim that the WGAN gives us a more suitable choice of objective function than any other GAN. We can go further than this by providing a hierarchy of divergences with respect to their convergence.
Theorem 3.2.9 , Theorem 2). Let X be compact, and let µ, (µ n ) ⊆ Prob(X ). Then, considering all limits as n → ∞,
Proof.
See Appendix A.
2. This comes from the standard result that d W gives a metric for the weak * topology of (C b (X ), · ∞ ) on Prob(X ), and by definition, this is the topology of convergence in distribution. For a proof, see Villani (2008, Theorem 6.9 ).
3. By Pinsker's Inequality (Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006, Section A.2, p. 371), either case gives us one of
4. This comes from the fact, as argued above, that d TV and d W give the strong and weak * topologies on the dual of (C b (X ), · ∞ ) when restricted to the space of probability measures on X .
Finally, we observe how even a simple sequence of probability distributions converges under d W but not under d JS or d KL . This serves as a witness to Theorem 3.2.9.
Example 3.2.10 ( , Example 1). Let Z ∼ U [0, 1] be uniformly distributed over the unit interval. Let P 0 be the distribution of (0, Z) ∈ R 2 . Now let g θ (z) = (θ, z), with θ ∈ R and P θ the distribution for g θ (Z). In this case:
Hence, when θ n → 0, the sequence (P θn ) n∈N converges to P 0 only under the Wasserstein distance.
On the Viability of WGAN
In the above example, the JS divergence fails to give us continuous mapping θ → P θ , a desirable property. The next theorem shows us that, under mild assumptions, d W (µ µ θ ) is a continuous loss function on θ.
Theorem 3.2.11 , Theorem 1). Let X be compact, and let µ ∈ Prob(X ). Let Z be a random variable over another space Z.
2. If g is locally Lipschitz and there are local Lipschitz constants L(θ, z) such that
is continuous everywhere, and differentiable almost everywhere.
3. Statements 1-2 are false for d JS and the two KL divergences.
Proof.
1. Let γ be the distribution of (g θ (Z), g θ (Z)), so that γ ∈ Π(µ θ , µ θ ). Then (3.2.1) gives us
Since g is continuous in θ, we have that g θ (z)
point-wise in z. Since X is compact, there exists a positive constant M , independent of θ and z, such that for all θ, z, we have g θ (z) − g θ (z) ≤ M . By the Bounded Convergence Theorem,
The result follows.
2. Take g to be locally Lipschitz. This means that, fixing (θ, z), there exists a constant L(θ, z) and open set U such that (θ, z) ∈ U , and for every (θ , z ) ∈ U ,
Fix z = z. Taking the expectation in (3.2.6), we have for all (θ , z) ∈ U that
Hence d W (µ µ θ ) is locally Lipschitz. Therefore, d W (µ µ θ ) is everywhere continuous, and, by Rademacher's Theorem (Federer, 2014 , Theorem 3.1.6), differentiable almost everywhere.
3. Observe that Example 3.2.10 serves as the required counterexample.
Of course, in practice our generator functions will be neural nets. The following corollary shows that the previous result holds if we restrict our attention to these kinds of functions.
Corollary 3.2.12 , Corollary 1). Let g θ be any feedforward neural net 6 parametrised by θ, and p z a prior over z such that E z∼pz [ z ] < ∞. Then the assumptions of Theorem 3.2.11 are satisfied, and so d W (µ µ θ ) is continuous everywhere and differentiable almost everywhere.
Proof. Since g is a continuously differentiable function in (θ, z), for any fixed (θ, z), we have for all ε > 0 that L(θ, z) ≤ ∇ θ,x g θ (z) + ε is an acceptable local Lipschitz constant. It therefore remains to show that
This part of the proof is omitted. Refer to Arjovsky et al. (2017, Appendix C) for the technical details.
The WGAN Procedure
Evaluating d W (p r p θ ), where p θ is the distribution of our generator g θ , is often intractable. A more tractable approach, justified by the Kantorovich-Rubinstein Duality, would be to solve the problem 
The following theorem shows that this process is principled under the assumptions of the previous results.
Theorem 3.2.13 , Theorem 3). Let X be compact, and let p r ∈ Prob(X ). Let p θ be the distribution of g θ (Z) with Z a random variable with density p z and g θ a function satisfying the assumptions of Theorem 3.2.11. Then, there is a solution f : X → R to the problem
and we have
when both terms are well-defined.
Proof. The proof can be found in Appendix A.
To roughly approximate finding the function f that solves (3.2.2), train a neural network parametrised with weights w lying in a compact space W, and then perform back-propagation through
Here, we refer to f w as our critic, just as the original GAN had a discriminator D. When W is compact, 8 all the functions f w will be K-Lipschitz for some K depending only on W and not the individual weights w, allowing us approximate (3.2.2) up to an irrelevant scaling factor.
Does WGAN Resolve Convergence Problems? Mode Collapse
Arjovsky et al. recommend that WGAN critics be trained to optimality. In so doing, they claim, one avoids the phenomenon of mode collapse. The argument for this relies on the Goodfellow-Metz explanation for mode collapse. The reasoning is as follows: the hypothesis is that mode collapse comes from the fact (Proposition 2.6.1) that the optimal generator for a given discriminator is a map to the points for which the discriminator assigns the highest probability, so that each generator update step in training the MM-GAN is a partial collapse towards this function. Therefore, if the discriminator is close enough to optimality, the data points to which it will assign the highest probability will be precisely those that arise from the real data distribution p r , and so an optimal generator function given this discriminator will be a delta function valued 1 on all such data points.
It has also been observed empirically that WGANs avoid mode collapse in cases where the MM-GANs do not Fedus et al., 2017; Lucic et al., 2017) .
Failure to Converge
According to , the fact that the EM distance is continuous and differentiable a.e. means that, unlike the MM-GAN, we can train the critic to optimality without worrying about the convergence of the generator distribution.
Consider, for instance, the target and generator distributions given in Example 3.2.10. Unless the generator distribution has already matched the target distribution, the JS distance between the two is constantly log 2. This distance, as a result, gives no meaningful gradient for the generator to use for training, provided that the discriminator is sufficiently optimal so as to give an accurate estimate of the JS distance.
9 By contrast, the WGAN critic converges to a piecewise linear function through the constraint of its weights by clipping. In this sense, we see how the WGAN can tackle the issue of saturation.
Chapter 4
A Game-Theoretic Analysis of GANs
Many Paths to Equilibrium
Throughout the previous chapter, I considered the training of GANs as a minimisation of an adversarial divergence, itself the supremum over some loss function. In doing so, I took the perspective of GANs as optimising a generator, given a discriminator that is already optimal.
While such an approach does enjoy certain theoretical and empirical successes, 1 there are also two potential drawbacks. Firstly, it may be computationally impractical to train a discriminator to optimality at each step. An approach that trains the generator and discriminator simultaneously, or trains the discriminator for k iterations between each generator training step may simply converge to the solution more efficiently. When such an approach is taken with the neural net parameters trained via gradient descent, these approaches are referred to as simultaneous and alternating gradient descent (SimGD and AGD), respectively.
Secondly, as we have seen, certain GAN formulations do not perform well with optimal discriminators: the gradient along which the generator is being optimised collapses, meaning it converges to its optimum far more slowly. This was observed in an informal setting for MM-GANs in the original GAN paper by Goodfellow et al. (2014) .
Two Generalisations
In this chapter, I will investigate the consequences of relaxing two constraints implicitly imposed by the adversarial divergence view of training GANs.
1. We will now consider the cases in which the generator and discriminator are trained via simultaneous or alternating gradient descent. The former approach has been modelled in Mescheder et al. (2017) . The latter was first proposed by Goodfellow et al. (2014) (Algorithm 1 in this dissertation), with the number k of discriminator training steps between each generator training step treated as an algorithm hyperparameter to be carefully chosen. 2. We will allow for the discriminator and generator to be trained on objective functions whose absolute values differ. In particular, we now consider the discriminator and generator to seek to minimise loss functions J D and J G , respectively. Hence, unless J D = −J G as assumed in the previous chapters, we can no longer express the GAN objective by a single value function V .
For a simple example of a GAN that cannot be expressed by a single value function, consider the following example.
Definition 4.1.1 (Goodfellow et al. (2014) ). Let Z ⊆ R , X ⊆ R d be ambient data spaces, let p z be a prior distribution over Z, and let p r be the distribution of real data points over X . The non-saturating GAN (NS-GAN) is the game specified by the minimisation of loss functions
where
Such a game has been observed to enjoy empirical success: in particular, Fedus et al. (2017) show that on a variety of datasets, NS-GAN produces samples of a comparable quality to WGAN and its variants, while being easier to train. 
A Brief Review of Game Theory
Since the NS-GAN is not expressible by a single value function, our theoretical results about adversarial divergence minimisation no longer apply. To analyse GAN examples like NS-GAN, we require a game-theoretic framework. In doing so, we can provide answers to the following questions: Do solutions to the GAN game exist? What is the nature of such solutions?
Are there training methods for the discriminator and generator that allow us to converge to such solutions?
Two-Player Games
We begin with the definition of the type of game we are interested in. Unless stated otherwise, the definitions and results are adapted from Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, Chapters 2-3).
Definition 4.2.1. A strategic two-player game (A i ), (u i ) i=1,2 consists of, for players i = 1, 2
• a nonempty set A i (the set of actions available to player i)
• a payoff or utility function u i : A → R, where A = A 1 × A 2 .
If the set A i of actions of both players is finite, then the game is finite.
This game is referred to as strategic as each player chooses their plan of action once and for all, with these choices being made simultaneously. Given such a game, the most commonly used solution concept is that of a Nash equilibrium. The Nash equilibrium captures the idea that each player holds the correct expectation about the other players' behaviour and acts rationally; in a Nash equilibrium, neither player can gain by deviating from their strategy. Definition 4.2.2. Let a −i denote the strategy of player 1 for i = 2, and player 2 for i = 1. A Nash equilibrium of a strategic two-player game (A i ), (u i ) i=1,2 is a profile a * ∈ A of actions with the property that for i = 1, 2 we have
Minimax Games Definition 4.2.3. A strategic two-player game (
Remark 4.2.4. With an appropriate choice of minimax theorem, 4 we can show that an optimal solution to our adversarial divergence objective function exists, and that it coincides with a Nash equilibrium of a zero-sum game.
Unfortunately, such results do not apply to GANs. Typically, a minimax theorem requires the A i to be compact and the value function V (·, ·) to be convex in the first argument and concave in the second. In general, the value function will fail to have this property due to a lack of expressivity in the discriminator-generator function space. Even if we allow the discriminator and generator to range over a broader class of functions, the associated function spaces will no longer be compact. We see this failure in the mode collapse hypothesis, in which the minimax and maximin solutions are distinct.
Mixed Extensions to Games
Given that the GAN game consists in practice of making updates to the parameter space rather than the function space, is there any way we can generalise the notion of a Nash equilibrium to recover the guarantee of the existence of such an equilibrium for the game? The answer is a qualified yes.
Our required generalisation is that of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium: this will be a steady state of the game in which the players' choices are not deterministic, but instead determined probabilistically according to some distribution.
In particular, we denote by ∆(A i ) the set of probability distributions over A i and refer to a member of ∆(A i ) as a mixed strategy 5 of player i. A member of A i is referred to as a pure strategy. For any finite set X and δ ∈ ∆(X) we denote by δ(x) the probability that δ assigns to x ∈ X, and define the support of δ to be the set of elements x ∈ X such that δ(x) > 0. Given a profile (α 1 , α 2 ) of mixed strategies, we have a probability distribution over the set A. If each A i is finite, then the probability of the action profile a = (a 1 , a 2 ) is α 1 (a 1 ) · α 2 (a 2 ), and player i's evaluation of (α 1 , α 2 ) is a∈A (α 1 (a 1 ) · α 2 (a 2 )) · u i (a). This leads to the following definition.
Definition 4.2.5. The mixed extension of the strategic two-player game
is the set of probability distributions over A i , and U i : ∆(A 1 )×∆(A 2 ) → R assigns to each α ∈ ∆(A 1 ) × ∆(A 2 ) the expected value under u i of the probability distribution over A induced by α, so that
From this definition, it follows that U i is multilinear: for any mixed strategy profile α, any mixed strategies β i and γ i of player i, and any number λ ∈ [0, 1], that
Moreover, when each A i is finite, we have
for any mixed strategy profile α, where e(a i ) is the degenerate mixed strategy of player i corresponding to the pure strategy of just choosing a i . Definition 4.2.6. A mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of a strategic twoplayer game is a Nash equilibrium of its mixed extension.
It is plain to see, since each U i is multilinear, and any mixed strategy exclusively employing degenerate distributions can be readily identified with a strategy in A, that the set of Nash equilibria of a strategic game is a subset of its set of mixed strategy Nash equilibria.
In a well-known result, Nash (1950) showed that a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist if the action spaces A 1 , A 2 are finite. Of course, this condition fails to hold for the generator and discriminator of a GAN, whose strategy spaces are parameter spaces in R n , R m , respectively. However, we may restrict the parameter spaces such that the GAN game is a continuous game, where A 1 , A 2 are non-empty compact metric spaces and u 1 , u 2 are continuous functions on A. We then get a result that applies to the GAN game.
Theorem 4.2.7 (Glicksberg's Theorem (Glicksberg, 1952) ). Let G be a continuous game, in the sense described above. Then G has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Proof Idea. Though Glicksberg's own proof relies on a generalisation of the fixedpoint theorem used to prove Nash's existence theorem, an alternative proof given in Ozdaglar (2010, Lecture 6) makes use of Nash's existence theorem without any further fixed-point result. In particular, the continuous game is approximated with a sequence of finite games, each corresponding to successively finer discretisations of the original game. Nash's existence theorem produces an equilibrium for each approximation, which we can show using the weak topology and the continuity assumptions to converge to an equilibrium of the original game. The full proof is given in Section B.1.
Game-Theoretic Results for GANs 4.3.1 Mixing GANs
Two immediate problems arise with applying Glicksberg's Theorem to GANs. Firstly, we may for practical purposes be concerned about the support size of the mixed strategy. In other words: how many generators does it take to fool a discriminator of a certain strength? A classical result tells us that, so long as our generators are capable of producing simple Gaussian distributions, we can arbitrarily approximate p r . Yet if the support size necessary to achieve this is too large, then training so many generators will be computationally prohibitive.
Secondly, it is not clear what it means for a generator to employ a mixed strategy. Of course, the generator induces a probability distribution p G which it aims to be close to p r . However, this is not the relevant probability distribution when considering mixed strategies in the GAN game. Instead, a mixed strategy would be a distribution over the parameters of G -in other words, a mixed strategy is a probability distribution over functions that induce probability distributions! Arora et al. (2017) show how a mixture of finitely many generators and discriminators may approximate the minimax solution of the GAN game. Firstly, we define such an approximate equilibrium.
,2 be a mixed strategic two-player game, and let ε > 0. A mixed strategy profile α * = (α * 1 , α * 2 ) is an ε-approximate equilibrium for G if, for some i = 1, 2,
This leads Arora et al. to prove a theorem showing both the existence of an ε-approximate equilibrium using a finite mixture of generators and single discriminator, and a procedure for constructing an ε-approximate pure equilibrium. In doing so, we address the two concerns above. This theorem holds for the neural net divergence, defined here. Definition 4.3.2 (Arora et al. (2017) ). Let X ⊆ R d be an ambient data space, let p G be the distribution induced by our generator function, and let p r be the distribution of real data points over X . Let F be a class of neural networks from R d to [0, 1] , such that if f ∈ F, then 1 − f ∈ F. Let φ be a measuring function: that is, φ : [0, 1] → R be concave and monotone. The neural F-divergence with respect to φ between two distributions µ, ν supported on X is defined as
Remark 4.3.3. Note that, in seeking a generator G that minimises
we are seeking a solution to a zero-sum game, with the loss functions defined as expected. Furthermore, the neural net divergence may be seen as a generalisation of the practical instantiations of the JS and Wasserstein distance (setting φ(x) = log(x) or φ(x) = x, respectively), where the term 'practical' denotes the fact that our function space consists of neural networks. As such, any results we can prove about minimising neural net divergence will be highly relevant to the GAN examples most prominently considered so far.
We are now in a position to give the main positive result with regards to GANs and the existence of equilibria. 
Suppose the generator and discriminator are both k-layer neural networks (k ≥ 2) with p parameters, and the last layer uses the ReLU activation function f (x) = max{0, x}. Then there exists (k + 1)-layer neural networks of generators G and discriminator D with O
parameters, such that there exists an ε-approximate pure equilibrium with value 2φ(1/2) to the game induced by d F ,φ (p r p G ).
Proof. The proof can be found in Appendix B, Section B.2.
We have now seen how, when we consider GANs qua strategic zero-sum twoplayer games, we are able to establish the existence of approximate solutions to a broad variety of GAN games even when taking into account the limitations of the generator and discriminator functions.
Of course, non-zero-sum games such as the NS-GAN are not covered by this result, which only applies when the generator and discriminator are optimising for the same value function. However, as shown previously, Glicksberg's Theorem guarantees the existence of mixed strategy Nash equilibria for such a game, given the plausible assumption that the parameter spaces of the neural network are compact.
It is an open problem whether the procedure for producing a single neural network that simulates a 'mixed strategy' can be extended to guarantee the existence of pure equilibria in non-zero-sum games, or whether we could get a realistic bound for the support size of such a mixture in exchange for settling for an ε-approximate equilibrium.
Frontiers of Research
In this final section, I will briefly review some of the ongoing research in game theory that is applicable to better understanding the dynamics and possible solutions of GAN games.
Existence does not Guarantee Convergence
As Arora et al. (2017, p. 15) observe, in the practical cases in which V (·, ·) is not convex-concave, the mere existence of an equilibrium does not guarantee that a simple algorithm like gradient descent will converge to it. The following is a pathological example.
6 for a non-GAN zero-sum game that fails to converge to its equilibrium using gradient descent.
Example 4.4.1 (Goodfellow (2016) , Sections 7.2 and 8.2). Consider a zero-sum game with two players that each control a single scalar value. The minimising player controls scalar x, the maximising player controls scalar y, and the value function for the game is V (x, y) = xy.
(4.4.1)
By solving ∂ x V (x, y) = 0 and ∂ y V (x, y) = 0, we can establish that there is a saddle point at x = y = 0. Moreover, this saddle point is a Nash equilibrium: if the minimising player fixes x = 0, the maximising player cannot attain a better score than at y = 0, and vice versa. Now, suppose the players were to learn this equilibrium via SimGD. To simplify the problem, we imagine that gradient descent is a continuous time process with an infinitesimal learning rate, so that the SimGD is described by the following system of partial differential equations:
Clearly, these evaluate to This differential equation has the solution
(4.4.8) Figure 4 .1: Images sampled from a Coulomb GAN after training on the CelebA (first row), LSUN bedrooms (second row), and CIFAR 10 (last row) datasets. Image taken from .
These dynamics form a circular orbit, so that SimGD with an infinitesimal learning rate will orbit around the equilibrium forever, at the same radius that it was initialised. Moreover, a larger learning rate can overshoot, causing SimGD to spiral outward forever. Hence, unless the players find themselves at the equilibrium upon initialisation, they will never approach the equilibrium using SimGD.
Convergence to Other Types of Equilibria
Some recent work has established the existence of other types of equilibria that a GAN will be guaranteed to converge to, or other types of GAN that are guaranteed to converge to an equilibrium.
As an example of the former, Hazan et al. (2017) defines a natural notion of regret for the players of a GAN game, and gives gradient-based methods that guarantee convergence to a newly-defined notion of local, regret-based equilibrium. Though the paper specifically refers to MM-GAN games, the result can in fact be generalised to any GAN game whose loss functions are bounded, Lipschitz, and have Lipschitz gradients.
It remains to be seen, however, whether a generator-discriminator pair that attains such an equilibrium produces samples that synthesise p r well. Could there be a relation that holds between p r and p G when an equilibrium is reached? Recall, in the case of the IMM-GAN, the minimax solution coincided with the two distributions in fact being equal.
As an example of the latter, introduces a new version of the GAN problem which treats the data samples as charged particles on a potential field. This GAN model possesses only one Nash equilibrium, which is optimal in that we get p r = p G .
However, this approach suffers from the drawback that it requires the discriminator to learn slow enough to accurately estimate the potential function induced by the generator, and that the generator must in turn learn even more slowly. Moreover, the samples it produces for some standard datasets are not particularly visually appealing (see Figure 4 .1).
Chapter 5 Conclusion
The literature on GANs is still in a very early stage, with the vast majority of papers developing their theory having been published within the last 18 months. As we have seen, there is still some way to go in understanding GAN training: what it means for GANs to perform well, and what guarantees there are on whether a GAN will perform well.
Nonetheless, both the topological and game-theoretic perspectives on GANs allow for us to propose versions of GANs that avoid the immediate pitfalls like mode collapse. Moreover, they allow us to make use of the theoretical insights from these areas: for instance, the Wasserstein GAN is inspired by previous research in optimal transport.
There is still plenty of work to be done on GANs: the game-theoretic approach seems particularly promising and under-explored. It seems, moreover, that any progress made with training GANs using this approach would require tools in algorithmic game theory that would have applications elsewhere in the field. Furthermore,
Therefore,
By taking lim sup on both sides, we get that
for all ε > 0, and so d KL (µ n µ m ) → 0.
Likewise, we define g n = dµ dµm and B n = {g n > 1+ε}, showing mutatis mutandis that d KL (µ µ m ) → 0. From this, we conclude that
(⇐) Using the triangle and Pinsker's inequalities, we get
Proof of Theorem 3.2.13. Define
wheref ∈ F = Lip 1 (X ) and θ ∈ R d . Since X is compact, we know by the Kantorovich-Rubinstein duality (Theorem 3.2.2) that there is an f ∈ F such that
(A.0.1) Now define X * (θ) to be the set of f such that (A.0.1) holds. The duality tells us that this set is non-empty. Moreover, by an envelope theorem (Milgrom and Segal, 2002 , Theorem 1) we have
for any f ∈ X * (θ), when both terms are well-defined. Now take an f ∈ X * (θ). Then, when the first two terms are well-defined,
The technical remainder of this proof is to show that
is locally Lipschitz on (θ, z) with constants L(θ, z) given by the assumption on g. Hence, by Rademacher's Theorem (Federer, 2014, Theorem 3.1.6) , f (g θ (z)) is differentiable almost everywhere for (θ, z) jointly. In other words, the set A = {(θ, z) | f • g is not differentiable} has measure 0.
By Fubini's Theorem, this implies that for almost every θ, the section A θ = {z | (θ, z) ∈ A} has measure 0. Fix some θ 0 such that the measure of A θ 0 is null, and the RHS of equation (A.0.3) is well-defined. For this θ 0 , we have that ∇ θ f (g θ (z))| θ 0 is well-defined for almost any z, and p z -almost everywhere.
By our Lipschitz assumption, we know that
is well-defined for almost every θ 0 . Therefore,
By the differentiability of f • g, the term inside the integral converges p z -almost everywhere to 0 as θ → θ 0 . Moreover,
Furthermore, since E z∼pz [2L(θ 0 , z)] < +∞ by the Lipschitz assumption, by dominated convergence equation A.0.5 tends to 0 as θ → θ 0 , so that
for almost every θ, and in particular when the RHS is well-defined. The LHS is also proven to exist simultaneously. This proof is as in Ozdaglar (2010, Lecture 6) . We first give a generalised definition of a continuous game.
Definition B.1.1. A continuous game is a game I, (S i ), (u i ) where I is a finite set, the S i are non-empty compact metric spaces, and the u i : S → R are continuous functions valued on S = × i∈I S i .
Let u = (u 1 , ..., u I ) andũ = (ũ 1 , ...,ũ I ) be two profiles of utility functions (|I| = I) defined on S such that, for each i ∈ I, the functions u i ,ũ i are bounded and measurable. We can define the distance between the utility function profiles u and u as max
Clearly, this distance is symmetric, obeys the triangle inequality, and is positive definite. Let G = I, (S i ), (u i ) andG = I, (S i ), (ũ i ) be two games, and let σ be an equilibrium of G. We can show that, if u andũ are close with respect to the distance given above, σ is an ε-equilibrium ofG. Here, the definition of a ε-equilibrium for G generalises the definition given for a two-player game (Definition 4.3.1).
Lemma B.1.2. Let G be a continuous game. Assume that σ k → σ and ε k → ε as k → ∞, where for each k, σ k is an ε k -equilibrium of G. Then σ is an ε-equilibrium of G.
Proof. We have by definition
Taking the limit as k → ∞ in (B.1.2), and using the continuity of the utility functions together with the convergence of the mixture distributions under the weak topology, we obtain
Hence σ is an ε-equilibrium of G.
The next step is to define a notion of closeness of two strategic games, given the distance of utility function.
Definition B.1.3. Let G = I, (S i ), (u i ) and G = I, (S i ), (u i ) be two strategic games. We say that G is an α-approximation to G if for all i ∈ I and s ∈ S, we have
Lemma B.1.4. If G is an α-approximation to G and σ is an ε-equilibrium of G , then σ is an (ε + 2α)-equilibrium of G.
Proof. For all i ∈ I and s i ∈ S i , we have
The next proposition gives us the 'discretisation' necessary to approximate our continuous game to an arbitrary degree of accuracy.
Lemma B.1.5. For any continuous game G and any α > 0, there exists an 'essentially finite' game which is an α-approximation to G.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 4.3.4
We must first show that there is a finite mixture of generators and discriminators that can approximate the equilibrium that exists for infinite mixtures.
Suppose φ is an L φ -Lipschitz concave measuring function bounded in [−∆, ∆]. Let U, V ⊆ R p be the (compact) parameter spaces of the generator and discriminator, respectively. Suppose the generator and discriminators are L-Lipschitz with respect to the parameters and L -Lipschitz with respect to inputs. Suppose further the value function F for the minimax game is given by the neural F-divergence 1 with respect to φ:
(B.2.1) Furthermore, we suppose the generator can approximate any point mass: that is, for all points x and any ε > 0, there is a generator such that
Note: all of the proofs within this section are as in Arora et al. (2017, Appendix B) .
Lemma B.2.1 (Arora et al. (2017) , Theorem 4.2). In the above setting, there exists a universal constant C > 0 such that for any ε > 0, there exists
generators G u 1 , ..., G u T such that, if S u is the uniform distribution on u i , and D is a discriminator that outputs only 1/2, then (S u , D) is an ε-approximate Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let V be the value of the associated zero-sum game. One strategy of the discriminator is to just output 1/2. Since this strategy has payoff 2φ(1/2) no matter what the generator does, it follows that V ≥ 2φ(1/2). By assumption, for any point x and any ε > 0, there is a generator G x,ε such that E z∼pz [ G x,ε (z) − x ] ≤ ε. For any ζ > 0, we can take a sample x ∼ p r , and use the generator G x,ζ . Let p ζ be the distribution generated by this mixture of generators. By the point mass approximation property of the generators, d W (p r p ζ ) ≤ ζ. Combining this with the fact that the discriminator is L -Lipschitz and that φ is L φ -Lipschitz, it holds for any discriminator D v that
Here, the last step uses the assumption that φ is concave. Hence
Letting ζ → 0, we get that V = 2φ(1/2). Now let (S u , S v ) be the pair of optimal mixed strategies as given by Glicksberg's Theorem (Theorem 4.2.7), and let V be the optimal value. We will show that, by randomly sampling T generators from S u , we get the desired mixture with high probability.
First, we construct ( ε 4LL L φ )-nets for the discriminator parameter space V. Let A be the set of centres for such nets. Since V is compact, A is finite. Moreover, by a standard construction of such nets, we have that
for some constant C . Let u 1 , ..., u T be independent samples from S u . By the Chernoff bound, for any net centre a ∈ A,
Therefore, when T = C∆ 2 p log(LL L φ p/ε) ε 2
and the constant C is greater than 2C , then with high probability this inequality is true for all a ∈ A. For any v ∈ V, let a be the closest point in the net, so by construction v − a ≤ ε 4LL L φ . Using this, one can derive straightforwardly that F (u, v) is (2LL L φ )-Lipschitz in both u and v, so that
We then get for any v ∈ V that
Therefore, this mixture of generators can win against any discriminator, and by a probabilistic argument, there must exist such generators. Since the discriminator given by constant 1/2 can achieve the value V regardless of the generator value, we get an approximate equilibrium.
Given the existence of the approximate equilibrium, the next step to prove the existence of an approximate pure equilibrium is to construct a single generator that can approximately generate the mixture distribution of generators. To do so, we pass our noise input h ∼ p z through all the generators G u 1 , ..., G u T and implement a 'multi-way selector' to select a uniformly random output from G u i (h), where i ∈ [T ].
First, we show how to compute a step function using a two-layer neural network.
Lemma B.2.2 (Arora et al. (2017) , Lemma 3). Let q be a positive integer and z 1 < ... < z q . For any 0 < δ < min i∈[q−1] (z i+1 − z i ), there is a two-layer neural network with single input h ∈ R that outputs q + 1 numbers x 1 , ..., x q+1 such that 1.
q+1 i=1 x i = 1 for all h; 2. when h ∈ [z i−1 + δ/2, z i − δ/2], we have that x i = 1 and all the other x j are 0.
When h ≤ z 1 − δ/2 only x 1 is 1, and when h ≥ z q + δ/2 only x q+1 = 1.
Proof. Using a two-layer neural network with ReLU activation functions, we can compute the function
This function evaluates to 0 for all h < z i − δ/2, and 1 for all h ≥ z i + δ/2, and changes linearly in-between. Writing
x q = f i (h) − f i−1 (h) ∀i ∈ {2, 3, ..., q}, we see that these functions satisfy (1)-(2).
Using these step functions, we can design the multi-way selector.
Lemma B.2.3 (Arora et al. (2017) , Lemma 4). In the setting above, suppose the generator and discriminator are both k-layer neural networks (where k ≥ 2), and the last layer uses the ReLU activation function. Then there is a (k +1)-layer neural network with O ∆ 2 p 2 log(LL L φ ·p/ε) ε 2
parameters that can generate a distribution within δ TV distance of the mixture of G u 1 , ..., G u T .
Proof Idea. Since we have implemented step functions from Lemma B.2.2, we can pass the input through all the generators G u 1 , ..., G u T . At the last layer of each G u i , we add a large multiple of −(1 − x i ), where x i is the i-th outputof the network in Lemma B.2.2. Then, if x i = 0, this will effectively 'de-activate' the network by bringing it below the threshold of the ReLU function. However, if x i = 1, this will have no effect. By Lemma B.2.2, we know that most of the time only one of the x i 's will be 1, so that only one generator is selected.
Proof. Suppose the input for the generator is (h 0 , h) ∼ N (0, 1) × p z , where samples are drawn independently. We will pass the input h through the generators and get outputs G u i (h), and then use h 0 to select one of these outputs as the 'true' output.
Let z 1 , ..., z T −1 be real numbers that divide the probability density of a Gaussian into T equal parts. Choose δ = δ/(100T ) in Lemma B.2.2 to get a 2-layer neural net that computes step functions x 1 , ..., x T . Then the probability that (x 1 , ..., x T ) has more than one non-zero entry is smaller than δ. Now, for the output of G u i (h), in each output ReLU gate, add a multiple of −(1 − x i ) that is larger than than the maximum possible output. Therefore, when x i = 0, the result before the ReLU will be negative and so the output will be 'disabled', and when x i = 1 the output will be preserved. Call this modified networkĜ u i . ThenĜ u i = G u i when x i = 1 and G u i = 0 when x i = 0. Now add a layer that outputs the sum ofĜ u i .
By construction, when (x 1 , ..., x T ) has only one non-zero entry, the network correctly outputs the corresponding G u i (x i ). The probability that this happens is at least 1 − δ, and so the TV distance with the mixture is bounded by δ. parameters, such that there exists an ε-approximate pure equilibrium with value 2φ(1/2) to the game induced by d F ,φ (p r p G ).
Proof. Let T be large enough so that there exists an ε/2-approximate mixed Nash equilibrium. Let the new set of generators be constructed as in Lemma B.2.3, with δ ≤ ε/(4∆) and G u 1 , ..., G u T as the original set of generators. Let D be the discriminator that always outputs 1/2, and G be the 'multi-way selector' generator constructed by the T generators from the approximate mixed equilibrium. Let F * (G, D) denote the value for the new two-player game.
2 For any discriminator D v , we have
Here, the bound for the first term comes from Lemma B.2.1, and the fact that the expectation is smaller than the maximum of expected values. The bound for the second term comes from the fact that changing a δ amount of probability mass can change the payoff F by at most 2∆δ (recalling that φ is bounded in [−∆, ∆]). Therefore, the generator will still fool all discriminators, and we therefore get the required pure equilibrium.
